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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where rms sell dierentiated
products and consumers search the market for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger market equilibrium,
all rms look alike and so the probability a rm is next in the queue consumers follow when visiting
rms is equal across non-visited rms. However, after a merger, insiders raise their prices more than
the outsiders so consumers search for good deals rst at the non-merging stores and then, if they do not
nd any product satisfactory enough, they continue searching at the merging stores. When search cost
are negligible, the results of Deneckere and Davidson (1985) hold. However, as search costs increase, the
merging rms receive fewer customers so mergers become unprotable for suciently large search costs.
This new merger paradox is more likely the higher the number of non-merging rms.
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11 Introduction
One of the most important insights in merger analysis is that merging is not very attractive in
environments where rms compete in quantities and oer similar products (Salant et al., 1983). This
result, known as the merger paradox, arises because the output reduction of the merging rms, which
favors the coalition partners, is accompanied by an output expansion of the non-merging ones, which hurts
them and has a dominating in
uence. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that price-setting rms selling
horizontally dierentiated products, other things equal, always have an incentive to merge. This result
arises because price increases of the merging rms, which favor the coalition partners, are accompanied by
price increases of the non-merging rms, which also favors them.
While no one would deny that searching for price and product t is costly in real-world markets
{think for example about the time we spend test-driving new cars, acquiring new furniture, trying on new
clothes, etc.{ there has been little work in the industrial organization literature on the in
uence of search
costs on the incentives to merge and on the aggregate implications of mergers. In this paper we argue that
when search costs are important mergers may become unprotable, even if they involve rms competing
in prices and selling horizontally dierentiated products.
Our model has a nite number of rms selling dierentiated products. The exact utility a buyer
derives from consuming a product can only be ascertained upon visiting the seller. Consumers search for
satisfactory deals sequentially. Firms compete in prices. In the pre-merger market, all rms look alike and
when consumers pick a rst shop to visit, they do so in a random way. Those consumers who fail to nd
a satisfactory product continue searching and once again they pick the next shop to visit randomly; and
so on. This model was introduced by Wolinsky (1986) and was further studied by Anderson and Renault
(1999). When search cost is equal to zero, the model is similar to Perlo and Salop (1985) and merger
analysis gives the same results as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
When search cost is positive, higher prices charged by the merging stores result in consumers searching
rst at the non-merging rms' and then, in the event they fail to nd a satisfactory product in those
rms, continue searching at the merging stores. In equilibrium, as search costs increase, the share of
consumers who walk away from the non-merging stores and show up at the merged shops falls, which makes
merging less protable. We show that any 2-rm merger is unprotable if search costs are suciently high.
Moreover, we show that any arbitrary k-rm merger becomes unprotable if search costs and the number of
non-merging rms are suciently high. These results establish a new merger paradox. What is interesting
about this paradox is that it arises even if rms sell horizontally dierentiated products and compete in
prices.
Janssen and Moraga-Gonz alez (2007) also study mergers in a consumer search market. In contrast
with the present paper, they focus on markets where rms sell homogeneous products and the equilibrium
is in mixed pricing strategies. Their main result is that mergers have redistributive eects with consumers
searching little getting better o at the expense of consumers who search a lot. Since in the post-merger
market consumers visit merging and non-merging rms in an order that maximizes expected utility, our
paper is also related to the recent literature on ordered search. Arbatskaya (2007) studies a market for
homogeneous products where the order in which rms are visited is exogenously given. In equilibrium
2prices must fall as the consumer walks away from the rms visited rst. Zhou (2009a) considers the case
of dierentiated products and nds the opposite result. Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) study the
implications of \prominence" in search markets. In their model, there is a rm that is always visited rst
and this rm charges lower prices and derives greater prots than the rest of the rms, which are visited
randomly after consumers have visited the prominent rm. Zhou (2009b) extends the ideas in Armstrong
et al. (2009) to the case in which a set of rms, rather than just one, is prominent. In our model, the
merging stores, by raising their prices to internalize the pricing externalities they exert on one another,
confer the non-merging rms a \prominent" position in the marketplace. In Haan and Moraga-Gonz alez
(2008), rms gain prominence by advertising more and/or better. They nd that rms need not benet
from higher consumer search costs. Also related is the paper of Horta csu and Syverson (2004), who present
a model where sampling probability variation across rms is used to explain price dispersion in the mutual
funds industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the consumer search model.
Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis, for both cases, the pre-merger market and the post-merger
market. Section 4 oers some concluding remarks. Various proofs are placed in an appendix to ease the
reading of the paper.
2 The model and the pre-merger symmetric equilibrium
We use Wolinsky (1986) model of search for dierentiated products. On the supply side of the
market there are n  3 rms selling horizontally dierentiated products. All rms employ the same
constant returns to scale technology of production and we normalize unit production costs to zero. On the
demand side of the market, there is a unit mass of consumers. A consumer m has tastes described by an
indirect utility function
umi(pi) = "mi   pi;
if she buys product i at price pi: The parameter "mi can be thought of as a match value between consumer
m and product i: Match values are independently distributed across consumers and products. We assume
that the value "mi is the realization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [0;1]: No rm can observe
"mi so practising price discrimination is not feasible. In what follows we will denote z`  maxf"1;"2;:::;"`g.
For later reference, it will also be useful to calculate the optimal price of a multi-product monopolist selling
` varieties, which we denote pm
` : This price maximizes p(Pr[z`  p]); and this gives pm
` = (1+`)  1
`. Setting
` = 1; we have the single-product monopolist, whose price will simply be denoted pm:
Consumers search sequentially with costless recall. We assume that search cost s is relatively small
so that the rst search is always worth, that is:
0  s  s  Pr["  pm]E["   pm j "  pm];
which yields s  (1   pm)2=2: When search cost is equal to zero, the model is similar to Perlo and Salop
(1985).
3Pre-merger market
We focus on symmetric equilibrium.1 Following Wolinsky (1986), let p denote the price charged by
rms other than rm i and consider the (expected) payo to a rm i which deviates from the symmetric
equilibrium by charging a price pi. Assume pi  p without loss of generality.
We start by computing the probability that a consumer accepts the oer of rm i, conditional on
visiting rm i rst. Suppose that the purchase option at rm i gives the buyer utility "i pi. If "i pi < 0,
the consumer will search again given our assumption s < s. Suppose "i   pi  0. In equilibrium, a buyer
who contemplates searching again expects to see a price of p at the next shop to visit. Therefore, searching
one more time, say at rm j; yields gains only if "j > "i  pi +p  x, i.e., if the consumer prefers the new
option over option i. The expected benet from searching once more is then
 1
x
("   x)d" =
1
2
(1   x)2 (1)
Searching one more time is worthwhile if and only if these incremental benets exceed the cost of search
s. The buyer is exactly indierent between searching once more and stopping and accepting the oer at
hand if x = x, with x given by the solution to 1
2(1 x)2 = s, i.e., x = 1 
p






we have that x 2 [pm
` ;1].
In any equilibrium x  p. Therefore, the probability that a buyer stops searching at rm i given
that rm i is visited rst, is equal to
Pr[x > x] = 1   x   pi + p;
provided the deviating price is not too high, i.e., pi < 1 x+p for otherwise every single consumer would
walk away from rm i:2
The consumer may visit rm i after having visited other rm(s). The probability that a consumer
goes to rm i in her second search and decides to acquire the oering of rm i right away is x(1 x pi+p).3
Similarly, the probability that a consumer goes to rm i in her `-th search and decides to acquire the oering
of rm i right away is x` 1(1   x   pi + p).
To complete rm i's payo calculation, we need to compute the joint probability that a consumer
walks away from every single rm in the market and happens to return to rm i to conduct a transaction,
that is
Pr[maxf0;zn 1   pg < "i   pi < x   p]
1We note that asymmetric equilibria can be sustained in this model. The idea is that if consumers believe that rms' prices
are, say, ordered as follows p1 < p2 < ::: < pn, then it is optimal for consumers to visit rms in that order and for rms to
price in a way to make consumer beliefs coherent. The unattractive feature of these equilibria is that they are not determined
by the underlying characteristics of the market, but by an indeterminacy of beliefs. We will ignore this types of equilibria in
our paper. A completely dierent situation is that studied in Zhou (2011) where it is assumed that the shops of the rms are
arranged in a particular way so consumers have no alternative than to visit them in a pre-specied exogenous order.
2In what follows we derive the payo of a rm under the assumption that pi < 1   x + p
: When this does not hold, the
payo is slightly dierent. We deal with this case later (see footnote 4).
3Letting j denote the rm visited earlier, this probability is given by Pr["i   pi > x   p
 > "j   p
].
4This probability is independent of the order in which rms are visited. We will denote it as ra to indicate





("i   pi + p)n 1d"i =
 x p
0
("i + p)n 1d"i =
1
n
(xn   pn): (2)





(1   x   pi + p) + ra

: (3)
We look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. After applying symmetry and the requirement
that consumer expectations are fullled, i.e., pi = p, the rst-order condition (FOC) is:
1   pn   p1   xn
1   x
= 0 (4)
It is easy to check that (4) has a unique solution that satises x  p  1   x:4 In addition, one can show
that the equilibrium price increases in the search cost s (Wolinsky, 1986; Anderson and Renault, 1999).




p(1   pn): (5)
3 Equilibrium when k rms merge
In this section we study the price implications of mergers and the incentives to merge. As in Deneckere
and Davidson (1985), we abstract from eciency gains and focus on the eects of joint (price) decision-
making. Consider that k rms merge, with 2  k  n   1. In what follows, a typical merging rm will be
denoted i; while a typical non-merging store will be denoted j:
As before we focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that all non-merging rms will be assumed
to charge ~ p, and all merging rms will be supposed to charge ^ p. As it is expected, suppose also that the
merging rms charge higher prices than the non-merging rms, i.e., ~ p < ^ p. This is reasonable because
internalizing the pricing externalities the merging rms confer on one another lead these rms to charge
higher prices than the non-merging ones.5
4The equilibrium price p
 is indeed an equilibrium if no rm has an incentive to deviate from it. So far we have checked
that \small" deviations are not protable. Suppose now that the deviant rm charges a price so high that consumers always
walk away from it and therefore this rm only sells to those consumers who come back to it after having visited all other
rms. In that case the deviant prots become i(pi;p
) = pi
 1
pi("i   pi + p
)
n 1d"i: Because of log-concavity of the uniform
density function, this prots expression is quasi-concave in own price (Caplin and Nalebu, 1991). Taking the derivative of the
deviating prots with respect to pi ; and setting pi = p
; we get di=dpijpi=p = (1  p
n  np
)=n < 0; where the inequality
follows from the fact that p
 solves (4). Since deviating prots are quasi-concave and they decrease at pi = p
; we conclude
they are even lower at prices pi such that x + pi   p
 > 1:
5A comment on the existence of other equilibria is in order now. As in the pre-merger market, it may be possible to
sustain asymmetric equilibria in the sense that distinct non-merging and/or distinct merging rms charge dierent prices.
Again, these asymmetries are not based on any underlying characteristic of the market and can only be sustained because
of the indeterminacy of consumer beliefs discussed in the previous section. We will abstract from these types of asymmetric
5Given this, optimal consumer search (see e.g. Kohn and Shavell, 1974) implies consumers should
start searching for a satisfactory product at the non-merging rms and then, if no alternative is found to
be good enough in those rms, continue searching at the merging ones. To calculate the equilibrium, we
proceed by computing the payo the two types of stores (merging and non-merging) would obtain when
deviating from the equilibrium prices. Then we derive the FOCs, impose the symmetry of prices across
rms of the same type, require consumer expectations to be correct, and solve for equilibrium prices.
Payo to a deviant non-merging store.
We now compute the payo of a non-merging store j that deviates from ~ p by charging ~ p 6= ~ p:
As all non-merging rms are supposed to charge the same price ~ p; consumers are assumed to visit them
randomly. Therefore the deviant rm may be visited in rst place, second place and so on till the (n k)-th
place. As any other non-merging store, the deviant has a probability 1=(n   k) of being visited in each of
these positions. When the consumer visits the deviant in the 1st, 2nd, ..., (n k 1)-th place, the decision
whether to continue searching or not takes into account that the next visited shop is also a non-merging
store. By contrast, when the deviant rm is the last non-merging store visited by the consumer, i.e. the
(n k)-th, the decision of the consumer is slightly dierent because the next shop to be visited is a merging
store and such a store charges a price dierent from the price of a non-merging store. Since the consumer
stopping rule is dierent at any of the rst n k  1 non-merging stores than that at the last non-merging
store, it is convenient to distinguish among those two cases.
 Consider the deviant non-merging rm j that is visited by a consumer in h-th place, with h =
1;2;:::;n   k   1: Suppose the deal a consumer observes upon entering the deviant's shop is "j   ~ p:
There are three circumstances in which the deviant sells to this consumer.
{ First, the consumer may stop searching at this shop and buy there right away. This occurs when
"j  x   ~ p + ~ p, where x was dened in section 2. Therefore, the joint probability a consumer
visits the deviant in h-th place and buys there directly is
Pr[zh 1   ~ p < x   ~ p < "j   ~ p] = xh 1 (1   x + ~ p   ~ p)
{ Second, the consumer may walk away from the rm visited in h-th place and come back to
it after visiting all non-merging stores. To see this, note that optimal search implies that the
equilibria. What may also happen is that a symmetric equilibrium where the merging rms charge a price lower than the
non-merging rms, i.e. ~ p
 > ^ p
, exists. This equilibrium is counterintuitive because we know that joint-prot maximization
leads the merging rms to internalize the pricing externalities they impose on one another, which calls for higher rather than
lower prices than the non-merging rms. Therefore, if this type of symmetric equilibrium exists, it must be because the force
of consumer beliefs more than osets the eect of joint prot-maximization. Later in Section 4.2 we prove that an equilibrium
with ~ p
 > ^ p
 fails to exist when for example the search cost is low or when the search cost is high. In those cases, the
strength of the order eect driven by consumer beliefs is relatively weak. The implication of this result is that if one takes
seriously such an equilibrium where the merging rms charge lower prices than the non-merging ones, consumer beliefs should
be discontinuous in search costs, which is dicult to justify. In Section 4.2, we also show that this type of equilibrium can
easily be destabilized when for example there exist consumers in the market who have zero search costs.
6consumer would walk away from the last non-merging store to visit one of the merging rms
if zn k   x   ^ p + ~ p. Moreover, if the consumer did arrive to the (n   k)-th non-merging
store it is because zn k 1   x: Since ^ p > ~ p, it is clear that the condition to leave the last
non-merging store and continue searching among the merging stores is more stringent than that
to continue searching among the non-merging stores. For this reason, the consumer may return
to the deviant rm after having visited all non-merging rms and buy there. This occurs when
Pr[maxfzn k 1   ~ p;x   ^ pg < ~ "j   ~ p < x   ~ p]
and this gives the following\coming back"or\returning"demand:
~ rnm 
 x ~ p+~ p
x ^ p+~ p





xn k   (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k

where the subindex \nm" refers to the fact that consumers return to the deviant rm after
having visited all the non-merging stores.
{ Finally, the consumer may walk away from the deviant non-merging rm and come back to it
after having visited all the rms in the market. This occurs when
Pr[maxfzn k 1   ~ p;zk   ^ p;0g < ~ "j   ~ p < x   ^ p]




("j + ~ p)
n k 1 ("j + ^ p)
k d"j (6)
where the subindex \a" again refers to the fact that consumers return after having visited all
the stores.
 We now consider the case in which the deviant rm is visited in (n   k)-th place. This type of rm
sells to the consumers in two cases:
{ First, the consumer stops searching at this shop and buys there right away. This occurs with
probability
Pr["j   ~ p  maxfzn k 1   ~ p;x   ^ pg and zn k 1 < x]
and this gives a demand




xn k   (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k
i
{ Second, the consumer walks away from this rm and comes back to it after visiting all the rms
in the market. In this second case we have exactly the same expression for returning consumers
as in (6).
7As a result, taking into account the dierent positions in which the deviant rm may be visited by
a consumer, we get the prots of a deviant non-merging rm:






(1   x + ~ p   ~ p) + ~ rnm + ~ ra

(7)
Payo to a deviant merging store.
We now compute the joint payo of the merging stores. Recall that since consumers expect the price
set at the merging rms ^ p to be greater than ~ p, they postpone visiting them until they have visited all
the non-merging rms. Suppose that the merging rms deviate by charging ^ p 6= ^ p.
Consider a consumer who walks away form the last non-merging store and observes a deal "i ^ p at the
rst merging store she visits. We note rst that such a consumer will never return to any of the non-merged
rms without rst visiting all other merging stores. This is because the utilities from all non-merged rms
are lower than  x   ^ p, which is exactly the reservation utility at any of the merging shops. We now ask
whether the consumer will continue searching after she visits the rst merging shop. Clearly, she will
continue searching when her best deal so far does not give her positive utility. She will do the same when
the highest utility so far is obtained at one of the non-merging stores, that is, zn k ~ p > "i ^ p > 0. In case
the best deal is the one at the merging store, the consumer will continue searching when "i   ^ p <  x   ^ p.6
As a result, the probability that the consumer arrives at the rst merging store and buys there right away
is
Pr["i   ^ p  x   ^ p  maxfzn k   ~ p] = (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k (1   x + ^ p   ^ p)
Suppose now the consumer walks into the h-th merged store, h = 2;:::;k: The probability this
consumer buys at that shop right away is
Pr[maxfzh 1   ^ p;zn k   ~ pg < x   ^ p < "i   ^ p]
This gives a demand (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k ( x   ^ p + ^ p)
h 1 (1   x + ^ p   ^ p): Taking into account the dierent
positions in which a merging rm may be visited, we have a demand equal to




( x   ^ p + ^ p)
h 1 (1    x + ^ p   ^ p) = ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k
h
1   ( x   ^ p + ^ p)
k
i
Some consumers visit all shops in the market and decide to return to one of the merging stores to
conduct a purchase. Then, the joint returning demand obtained by the merging stores is given by:
k X
h=1
Pr["i  maxfzk 1; zn k + ^ p   ~ p; ^ pg and "i <  x   ^ p + ^ p]
6We assume that a buyer who observes a deviation price ^ p at one of the merging stores does not change the expectation that
the other merged rms charge ^ p
. This assumption is adopted for technical reasons though it can easily be justied because
consumers usually need not know both whether the pricing of rms is joint or independent, or the ownership structure of the
rms. If consumers did know the merging rm deviates jointly in all its stores, then they would update their expectations
correspondingly and this would lead to a kink in the demand function of the merging rms. In this situation, downward
deviations lead to exactly the same payo as here. However, upward deviations lead to a dierent payo function, which
suggests the existence of multiple equilibria. Details can be obtained from the authors upon request.
8which gives the following \coming-back" demand
^ ra  k
  x ^ p
0
("i + ~ p)
n k ("i + ^ p)
k 1 d"i (8)
The payo to a deviating merged entity is then:
^  = ^ p
h
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k







3.1 An example with three rms
In order to develop some intuition for the main results, we brie
y discuss in this subsection an
example with three rms in which two of them merge. Prices and prots in the pre-merger market follow
straightforwardly from setting n = 3 in (4) and (5).
Firms payos in the post-merger market are
~  = ~ p

1   x   ~ p + ^ p +
1
3
(x3   ^ p3)

^  = ^ p
"
(x   ^ p + ~ p)





 x ^ p+^ p
^ p
"("   ^ p + ~ p)d"
#
with corresponding FOCs after applying symmetry








+ ~ p   3^ p2~ p + x  
x3
3
  ^ p  
1 + x2
= 0 (11)
It can be seen that this system of equations has always a solution and that such solution is unique and
constitutes a Nash equilibrium.7 For a xed search cost, it is straightforward to solve the FOCs numerically
for equilibrium prices. The results are given in Figure 1a, where we plot post-merger equilibrium prices, ^ p
and ~ p, against search costs. For comparison purposes, we also plot the pre-merger price, p. As expected,
all prices are increasing in search costs. As searching for price and product t becomes more costly, rms
have more market power over the consumers who pay them a visit and this results in higher prices for all
the rms.
As the graph reveals, post-merger prices, whether from merging or non-merging rms, happen to
be higher than the pre-merger price. This deserves a comment. In our model, the non-merging rm is
expected to charge a price lower than that of the merging stores and therefore it is visited rst by the
consumers; after that, if consumers do not nd a satisfactory product there, they proceed by checking the
goods on sale at the merging stores. In the terminology of Armstrong et al. (2009), what happens in our
model is that by merging, the joining rms end up conferring market prominence to the non-merging store.
Armstrong et al. (2009) study the eects of market prominence. They show, on the one hand, that
a prominent rm charges a lower price than the rest of the rms, as it is here the case. In their model this
price ranking originates from the order in which rms are visited by consumers. The rm that is visited
7Further, we can show that no other symmetric equilibrium exists (see Proposition ??(c).
9(a) Prices (b) Prots
Figure 1: Pre- and post-merger prices, and merger protability.
rst has a more elastic demand than the other rms just because the latter receive consumers who were
dissatised at the rst rm so in eect it is as if they had fewer acceptable options. In addition, Armstrong
et al. show that the prominent rm charges a lower price than in the case in which no prominent rm
exists. This result does not arise here. The reason is that in our model there is a second force counteracting
with the search-order eect: merging rms internalize pricing externalities between them and raise prices
over and above the prices they would charge if they were operating independent stores. This weakens
competition further and then all prices increase over and above the status quo (pre-merger) situation.
Figure 1b shows how the prots of a merging rm and a non-merging rm, ^ =k and ~ , vary with
search costs. In addition, the gure gives the pre-merger prots, , so we can readily assess whether
merging is worthwhile for the merging parties. The most important point to make here is that the prots
of a merging rm decline as search cost goes up. The reason is that, as the search cost increases, fewer
consumers walk away from the non-merging rm and visit the merging rms. This has a major implication
on merger protability: for suciently large search costs, merging is not individually rational for the
merging entities. The graph reveals that the non-merging rm gets a free ride and this ride is freer the
higher the search cost. This result resembles the well-known merger paradox, but its novelty is that it arises
under price competition with dierentiated product sellers. These insights can be proven more generally
and this will be the purpose of the next section and the Appendix.
3.2 Main results
We rst study the existence of equilibrium. For this, we rst dene a critical search cost value below
which all rms, including the merging rms, receive positive demand. Let
~ sk  Pr["  pm
k ]E["   pm
k j "  pm
k ]:
~ sk is the search cost that makes a consumer who has currently found no acceptable option indierent
between staying at home and visiting a monopoly rm that controls k stores. Since pm
k = (1 + k)  1
k,
~ sk = (1 (1+k)  1
k)2=2: In what follows, if a merger of k rms occurs, we will pay only attention to search
10costs in the set [0; ~ sk] (or  x 2 [pm
k ;1]). This ensures that each of the k merging stores has positive demand.
Taking the rst order derivatives of the payos in (7) and (9) with respect to deviation prices ^ p and
~ p respectively and applying the equilibrium requirement that consumer beliefs are correct, i.e., ^ p = ^ p and
~ p = ~ p, yields the following FOCs:
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k

1    xk   k^ p xk 1

+ k
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k (" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + k^ p)d" = 0 (12)
1  
1    xn k
1    x
~ p   ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k + (n   k)
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k d" = 0 (13)
Proposition 1. Assume that k rms merge. For any s 2 [0; ~ sk]; there exists a Nash equilibrium in the
post-merger market where consumers start searching at the non-merging stores and then they proceed by
searching at the merged ones. Merging rms charge a price ^ p and the non-merging stores charge a price
~ p; these prices are given by the unique solution to the system of FOCs (12)-(13) and the price ranking is
consistent with consumer search behavior, that is, ^ p > ~ p:
The proof of this Proposition, which is presented in the Appendix, has the following steps. We rst
show that there is a unique pair of prices f^ p; ~ pg that satises the FOCs. We then show that these prices
satisfy the inequality ^ p > ~ p, which immediately implies that the hypothesized consumer search behavior
is optimal.
Proposition 1 follows from the behavior of the reaction functions of the dierent types of rm. We
illustrate these ideas using Figure 2. In this Figure, the crossing point between the two blue reaction
functions gives the pre-merger equilibrium. The joint reaction function of the potentially merging rms
is denoted by r
pre
k , while the joint reaction function of the non-merging rms is denoted by r
pre
n k. In
the pre-merger market, consumers expect all rms to charge the same price so they visit rms randomly.
The joint reaction functions cross on the 45 degrees line so both types of rms charge p and consumers'
expectations are fullled.
When the potentially merging rms do indeed merge, two eects take place. On the one hand,
there is a search-order eect. Since the insider rms are supposed to internalize pricing externalities and
therefore raise their prices more than the outsider rms, consumers push the merging rms all the way
back in the queue they follow when they search for satisfactory products. On the other hand, there is an
internalization-of-pricing-externalities eect, as usual when rms merge.
By the search-order eect, the joint reaction curve of the merging rms shifts upwards from r
pre
k (in
blue) to rk (in green). This move captures the fact that the merging rms' demand becomes more inelastic
just because only consumers who have been disappointed at the non-merging stores happen to reach the
merged stores. By the same token, the joint reaction curve of the non-merging rms also changes because
of this search-order eect. In particular, it shifts to the left and turns clockwise from r
pre
n k (in blue) to
r
post
n k (in red). This move is the result of these rms gaining\prominence"in the marketplace. The crossing
point between the curves rk and r
post
n k gives the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game when n   k rms
are visited rst and the rest k of the rms later. This situation has been studied by Armstrong et al.
11(2009) and Zhou (2009). When there is just one prominent rm, Armstrong et al. (2009) show that the
price of the prominent rm will be lower than the price the rms would charge in a symmetric situation.
Zhou (2009) qualies this result demonstrating that when the number of prominent rms in the market is
more than 1, the price of prominent rms can be higher than the price rms would charge if they were all
symmetric.
Figure 2: Post-merger and pre-merger equilibria.
The change in the joint reaction curve of the merging stores due to the search-order eect is aug-
mented by the usual internalization-of-pricing-externalities eect, which shifts the joint reaction function
of the merging stores further from rk (in green) to r
post
k (in red). By strategic complementarity, the shift
in the reaction curve of the merging stores pushes all prices, whether from outsiders or insiders, up. The
post-merger equilibrium is given by the crossing point of the two red curves.
We explore next the relationship between the post-merger equilibrium prices and the pre-merger
equilibrium price.
Proposition 2. The ranking of pre- and post-merger equilibrium prices is p < ~ p < ^ p whenever one of
the following conditions holds: (a) the search cost is suciently low, (b) the search cost is suciently high,
(c) the number of rms n = 3.
From the discussion above around Figure 2, it should be clear that whether the post-merger equilib-
rium prices are higher or lower than the pre-merger equilibrium price is a priori ambiguous. Consider the
price charged by the non-merging rms. The fact that the potentially merging stores by actually merg-
ing confer a \prominent" position in the marketplace to the non-merging stores causes a direct downward
pressure on the price of the non-merging rms. As said before, when a rm becomes prominent its pool
of consumers becomes more elastic. In addition there are two indirect eects. The rst is that, since the
merging rms are relegated to the last positions of the queue consumers follow when they search, they
12tend to raise their prices. This eect arises because for the non-prominent rms it holds the opposite,
namely, that their demand becomes less elastic. By strategic complementarity, this weakens competition
in the marketplace and the non-merging rms tend to raise their prices as well. The last eect follows from
the fact that the merging rms internalize the pricing externalities they confer on one another. This also
tends to raise their price, and indirectly, by strategic complementarity again, the prices of the non-merging
rms. Similar considerations apply to the price of the merging rms. Our proposition shows that when
the search-order eects are not very strong then we are sure that all prices increase after a merger. We
note however that solving numerically the model we have found no example in which this does not happen.
Basically, what we always observe is similar to what happens in Figure 1a when n = 3:
We study next the relationship between the post-merger equilibrium prices and search costs. The
following result extends those in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) about how search costs
in
uence the symmetric equilibrium price to the merger situation studied here.
Proposition 3. The post-merger equilibrium prices ^ p and ~ p increase in search costs.
Our nal result explores merger protability.
Proposition 4. Assume that search cost s 2 [0; ~ sk]: Then: (a) Any 2-rm merger is not protable if the
search cost is suciently high. (b) Any arbitrary k-rm merger is not protable if the search cost and the
number of competitors are suciently high. (c) If search costs are suciently small, any arbitrary k-rm
merger is protable.
As expected, the case in which search cost is small reproduces naturally the situation in Deneckere
and Davidson (1985). However, as search costs increase, fewer consumers walk away from the non-merging
stores and visit the merged ones. This lowers the prots of the merging rms. Eventually, when the search
cost becomes relatively high, unless there are many rms in the industry and the merger comprises almost
all of them, merging becomes unprotable. The interest of this Proposition is that it puts forward a new
merger paradox, which arises under price competition with dierentiated products. The underlying reason
is based on search costs, something quite dierent from the merger paradox of Salant et al. (1983), which
concerns competition with decision variables that are strategic substitutes.
4 Discussion
4.1 Alternative distributions of consumer tastes
So far we have assumed that consumer tastes are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. In this
section we study the sensitiveness of our results to this assumption. For this purpose, we assume that the
distribution of match values is F(") = " with " 2 [0;1] and   1. The parameter  is a shifter of the
distribution of consumer preferences towards the right end of the interval of possible match values. When
 goes up, products become more homogeneous and, therefore, competition between rms becomes ercer.
Note also that the average willingness to pay, which is =(1 + ); also increases in the parameter .
With this distribution of match values, the price of a monopolist selling ` varieties becomes pm
` =
(1 + `)
 1=`. The threshold match value ~ x above which consumers stop searching becomes the solution to
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` )+1 beyond which no consumer
would ever visit the shops of a monopoly rm in control of ` shops. One can easily check that when  = 1
we get the same expressions for the monopoly price and maximum search cost we had in section 2.
For simplicity, let us assume that n = 3; as in section 3. It is easy to rewrite the payos of the rms
using the new distribution of match values. These are
~ (~ p; ^ p) = ~ p
"
1   (~ x + ~ p   ^ p)
 +
 ~ x ^ p+~ p
~ p
" 1 ("   ~ p + ^ p)
2 d"
#
^  (~ p; ^ p) = ^ p
"

1   (~ x   ^ p + ^ p)
2

(~ x + ~ p   ^ p) + 2
 x ^ p+^ p
^ p
"2 1("   ^ p + ~ p)d"
#
As above, equilibrium prices can be found by taking the FOCs, setting ^ p = ^ p and ~ p = ~ p and solving for
^ p and ~ p: Even in this simple environment with three rms, calculations get complicated when  can vary
freely.
Figure 3a shows the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium prices of Proposition 1. Initially there
are three rms and then two of them merge. The search cost is xed at s = 0:01 and  varies from 1 to 10.
The graph shows that no matter the value of , the price of the non-merging rms is lower than the price
of the merging rms. Moreover, we see that as  goes up, prices increase and then decrease. To understand
this, recall that as  goes up the intensity of competition increases and this tends to lower prices. At the
same time, as  goes up, the average willingness-to-pay also increases and this pushes prices up. The rst
eect dominates for high levels of ; while it happens otherwise for low levels of :
(a) Prices (b) Merger protability
Figure 3: Pre- and post-merger prices and merger protability.
In Figure 3b we show the region of search costs s and taste parameters  for which merging is
individually rational. The critical search cost level below which merging is protable, denoted scr, rst
increases and then decreases in . This result is intimately linked to the price result discussed above. When
 is small, an increase in  increases the price of the merging stores and this raises merger protability.
Eventually when  is relatively large, further increases in  make products too similar and this fosters
competition. In this case, as  increases a smaller search cost is needed to make merging unprotable.
144.2 Other symmetric equilibria
All the discussion so far has been on a symmetric equilibrium with the merging rms charging a higher
price than the non-merging rms and, correspondingly, consumers starting their search for satisfactory
products at the non-merging stores. This equilibrium is the natural extension of the equilibrium that
arises under perfect information (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) and exists for all (reasonable) levels of
the search cost. For this reason, it has been the focal point of the analysis so far.
However, as we mentioned above when we discussed the potential problems associated with the
indeterminacy of consumer beliefs about which type of rms charge the lowest prices (cf. footnote 5),
another symmetric equilibrium can be proposed. In such alternative symmetric equilibrium, consumers
hold the belief that the merging stores charge prices lower than those of the non-merging rms and,
correspondingly, they start their search for satisfactory products at the merging rms; rms respond by
setting prices in such a way that consumer beliefs are fullled.
In this Section we focus attention on such an alternative equilibrium. Our rst observation is that
this alternative symmetric equilibrium is somewhat counterintuitive. The reason is that, due to the
internalization-of-pricing externalities eect, we expect the merging rms to charge higher, rather than
lower, prices than the non-merging rms. Therefore, if such an equilibrium exists, it must be because
the power of consumer beliefs at dictating rm pricing is suciently strong so as to more than oset the
internalization-of-pricing externalities eect. Can this occur for all parameters? We do not expect it. From
the received theory we know that when the search cost is exactly equal to zero (Deneckere and Davidson,
1985), such price ranking is impossible. By \continuity" we expect this alternative equilibrium to fail to
exist when the search cost is positive but small. This is indeed what our next result shows. In addition,
we can show that the same is true when the search cost is very high or for example when the number of
rms is 3.
Proposition 5. Assume that k rms merge. Then a symmetric Nash equilibrium where ^ p < ~ p so that
consumers start searching at the merged stores and then proceed by searching at the non-merging stores
does not exist whenever one of the following conditions holds: (a) the search cost is suciently low, (b) the
search cost is suciently high, (c) n = 3, (d) the number of competitors is suciently large. As a result,
in all these cases, the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is unique.
The proof of this result is in the Appendix. There we rst derive the payo functions of the merging
and non-merging rms assuming that ^ p < ~ p. Then we show that when search cost is either suciently high
or suciently low, prot maximizing rms charge prices such that ^ p > ~ p, which leads to a contradiction.
This result implies that the alternative equilibrium where merging rms are visited rst can only exist for
intermediate levels of the search cost, which casts doubts about the appeal of the equilibrium. In fact,
taking such an alternative equilibrium seriously requires consumer beliefs to be discontinuous in search
costs, which is dicult to justify.
The intuition behind Propoition 5 is as follows. The price ranking of the rms is the outcome of the
tension between the search-order eect, which pushes merging rms that are visited rst to lower prices
relative to the non-merging rms, and the internalization-of-pricing-externalities eect, which works in the
opposite direction. The magnitude of the search cost aects the outcome of this tension. In fact, note
15that the search-order eect is practically non-existent when the search cost is arbitrarily close to zero,
while the internalization-of-pricing-externalities eect is the strongest. In this case, the second eect has a
dominating in
uence and this explains the result. When the search cost increases, the search-order eect
gains importance, while the internalization-of-pricing-externalities eect loses strength. For intermediate
levels of the search cost the equilibrium may exist (though not necessarily as demonstrated for the case
n = 3). Finally, when search costs are very high, prices, whether form merging or not merging rms,
are close to monopoly prices and the search-order eect loses again against the internalization-of-pricing-
externalities eect.
We have explored alternative ways to aect the trade-o between the search-order eect and the
internalization-of-pricing-externalities eect and rule out the alternative equilibrium where the merging
rms charge lower prices and are visited rst. What is important is to weaken the power consumer
beliefs have at dictating equilibrium prices. For example, one can show that this equilibrium fails to exist
when there is a suciently large number of consumers who have perfect information. The equilibrium in
Proposition 1 by contrast survives this modication as well as our main result in Proposition 4.
Figure 4: Model with a fraction  of zero-search-cost consumers
To illustrate this last point, we provide next the outcome of the numerical analysis of a slightly
modied model where we partition the set of consumers into two fractions: a fraction of the consumers 
have zero search costs while the rest of the consumers have positive search costs. The rest of the model
remains exactly the same. In Figure 4 we set n = 7 and plot the (blue) region of parameters for which
an equilibrium where a 2-rm merger charges a price lower than the price of the non-merging rms exists.
The graph clearly shows the observation in Proposition 5 that, when all consumers have positive search
costs, this equilibrium only exists for intermediate levels of the search cost. As we increase the fraction of
consumers who have zero search cost, the equilibrium fails to exist. The equilibrium in Proposition 1 by
contrast exists for all parameters and it can be seen that no matter the level of , a merger is unprotable
provided that the search cost is suciently large.
165 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the role of search costs for merger protability. We have used a model where
rms compete in prices to sell dierentiated products and consumers search sequentially to nd price and
product t information. When the search cost is set equal to zero, the model gives the results in Deneckere
and Davidson (1985). But when search costs are sizable, the price divergence between merging and non-
merging rms has implications for the path consumers follow when they search for satisfactory products.
Since optimal consumer search prescribes the consumers to visit rst the cheaper stores, the merging rms
lose a lot of custom when search costs are relatively high. Our main result is that merging becomes
unprotable when the search cost is suciently large. The paper thus shows that a merger paradox can
also arise when rms compete in prices to sell dierentiated products. The paradox arises because a merger
pushes the merging stores all the way back in the search order of consumers.
In the analysis of this paper we have followed the tradition and studied the implications of joint-
decision making. By doing this, the paper has focussed on the short-run eects of mergers and has therefore
abstracted from a number of issues that are relevant to mergers in the long-run. These issues include all
type of business organizational changes aimed at delivering cost reductions. Arguably, in situations where
search costs are important, these organizational changes may even include the shutting down of shops
and the crowding of products together, which have the potential to generate benecial search economies
for the consumers. These long-run considerations are studied in a separate paper (Moraga-Gonz alez and
Petrikait_ e, 2011). There we show that search cost economies may render a merger benecial for consumers.
176 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of the proposition is organized in three Claims. The rst Claim
shows that there is a pair of prices f^ p; ~ pg that satises the system of rst order conditions (12) and (13).
The second claim shows that such a pair of prices is unique. Finally, the third Claim demonstrates that
~ p < ^ p.
Claim 1. There is at least one pair of prices f^ p; ~ pg that satises (12) and (13).
Proof. We rst rewrite the FOC (12) as G(^ p; ~ p) = 0; where
G(^ p; ~ p) 
1   xk
kxk 1   ^ p + g (^ p; ~ p) (14)
and
g (^ p; ~ p) 
 x ^ p
0 (" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k (" + k^ p)d"
(x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k xk 1
The FOC G(^ p; ~ p) = 0 denes an implicit relationship between ^ p and ~ p: Let the function 1(~ p) dene this








@g=@^ p   1
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(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + k^ p)(" + ~ p)
n k 1 (x   ^ p   ")d" > 0
The denominator of (15) is however negative. To see this, we note rst that







= (n   k)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k (" + k^ p)d"
+ ( x   ^ p + ~ p)(k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k (2" + k^ p)d"
  ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k+1  xk 2 [2 x + (k   1) ^ p]: (16)
Assuming k > 2; let us take the derivative of the RHS of (16) with respect to  x: We obtain:
(n   k)  xk 2 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k [ x + (k   1) ^ p] + (k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k (2" + k^ p)d"
+ (k   1)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k+1  xk 3 [2 x + (k   2) ^ p]   2( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k+1  xk 2
  (n   k + 1)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k  xk 2 [2 x + (k   1) ^ p] + ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k+1 (k   2)  xk 3 [2 x + (k   1) ^ p]
which is equal to
 xk 3 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k [(n   k)  x[ x + (k   1) ^ p] + (k   1)( x   ^ p + ~ p)[2 x + (k   2) ^ p] 
2 x( x   ^ p + ~ p)   (n   k + 1)  x[2 x + (k   1) ^ p]   ( x   ^ p + ~ p)(k   2)[2 x + (k   1) ^ p]]
+ (k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k (2" + k^ p)d" (17)
18and can be simplied further to
  xk 2 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k [ x(n   k + 2) + (k   1) ^ p] + (k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k (2" + k^ p)d" (18)
If we now take the derivative of (18) with respect to  x we obtain
 
h
(k   2) xk 3 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k + (n   k)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1  xk 2
i
[ x(n   k + 2) + (k   1) ^ p]
  (n   k + 2)  xk 2 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k + (k   1)  xk 3 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k [2x + (k   2)^ p]
Putting terms together and simplifying, this is equal to
 (n   k)  xk 2 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 [ x(n + 1) + ~ p(k   1)] < 0:
This implies that the derivative of the RHS of (16) with respect to  x; given in equation (18), is decreasing
in  x: Setting  x equal to its lowest value, ^ p; in (18) gives
 ^ pk 2~ pn k [^ p(n   k + 2) + (k   1) ^ p] < 0:
As a result, the RHS of (16) is also decreasing in  x: If we set now  x = ^ p in the RHS of (16), we obtain
 ~ pn k+1^ pk 1 (k + 1) < 0. From this we conclude that (16) is negative. As a result, since the numerator
of @1 (~ p)=@~ p is positive and the denominator is negative, we infer that the function 1 (~ p) increases in ~ p:8
8When k = 2, equation (16) changes slightly. Therefore, we treat this case separately. If k = 2 then
g (^ p; ~ p) =
  x ^ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n 2 (" + 2^ p)d"
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2  x
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Then equation (16) is
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The derivative of the RHS of (19) with respect to  x is negative
(n   2)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2 ( x + ^ p) +
2n
n   1






2( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 1   (n   1)(2 x + ^ p)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2 =
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2









































































Since this expression is negative, the same arguments can be used to conclude that @G=@~ p is positive also when k = 2, which
implies that 1 (~ p) increases in ~ p.
19Now consider the other equilibrium condition. Let us denote the LHS of (13) as H (^ p; ~ p). The
condition H (^ p; ~ p) = 0 also denes an implicit relationship between ^ p and ~ p: Let the function 2(~ p) dene








We note that H increases in ^ p. In fact,
@H
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  x ^ p
0
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1    xn k
1    x
  (n   k)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 (1    xk)   (n   k)  xk~ pn k 1 < 0;
while for k = n   1 we get @H=@~ p =  2 < 0: As a result, we conclude that the function 2 is increasing in
~ p.
Therefore both 1 and 2 increase in ~ p. To show that at least one pair of prices f^ p; ~ pg exists that
satises the system of FOCs (12) and (13), we need to show that the functions 1 and 2 cross at least
once in the space [0;1=2]  [0; pm
k ]. As shown in Figure 5 we observe that 1 (0) > 0: For this, note that
G(^ p; 0) =
1    xk
k xk 1   ^ p +
1




(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + k^ p)"n kd":
We have shown above that G decreases in ^ p. Therefore, since
G(0;0) =







we conclude that 1 (0) > 0:
On the contrary, we now observe that 2 (0) < 0 (see Figure 5). This is because
H (^ p;0) = 1   ( x   ^ p)
n k + (n   k)
  x ^ p
0
"n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k d"
in increasing in ^ p and H (0;0) = 1    xn k + (n   k)
  x
0 "n 1d" > 0.
20Secondly, as depicted in Figure 5, we show that 1 (1=2) < pm
k < 2 (1=2); which ensures that the
functions 1 and 2 cross at least once in the area [0;1=2]  [0;pm
k ]: To see that 2 (1=2) > pm










1    xn k


































with respect to  x
we get
 
1   (n   k)  xn k 1 + (n   k   1)  xn k
2(1    x)
2   (n   k)






1    xk

< 0;
where the inequality follows from noting that the expression 1 (n   k)  xn k 1+(n   k   1)  xn k decreases
in  x and therefore it is higher than when we set  x = 1; that is, 1   (n   k)  xn k 1 + (n   k   1)  xn k 






is decreasing in  x.




















This expression is decreasing in n: In fact, its derivative with respect to n can be written as
2n k 1(pm
k )n k lnpm































k + (1   pm
k )ln2] < 0
The last inequatility follows from the fact that pm
k lnpm
k + (1   pm
k )ln2 < 0. This can be shown in three
steps. We check the sign of the expression with the lowest and highest values of k:
pm
k lnpm





















k + (1   pm
k )ln2] = 0
Let us now take the derivative of pm
k lnpm
k + (1   pm
k )ln2 with respect to k: We obtain the following:
(@pm
k =@k)(lnpm
k + 1   ln2): The sign of this expression depends on the sign of 1   ln2   lnpm
k = 1  
ln2   1
k ln(1 + k); which is monotonically increasing in k; rst negative and then positive. As a result,
pm
k lnpm
k + (1   pm
k )ln2 rst decreases and then increases in k. Together with the two facts above, we


























































is always negative. And because
H is increasing in ^ p; we obtain the result that 2 (1=2) > pm
k :
We now show that 1 (1=2) < pm

































with respect to n gives

























































1    xk





























T ( x) =





































= 1    xk   k xk 1pm
k  
















( x + (k   1)pm
k )
= 1    xk   k xk 1pm
k
and this expression decreases in x: Therefore, using  x = pm
















Since T ( x) decreases in  x we then conclude that T ( x) < T (pm
k ) = 0: As a result the functions 1 and 2
cross at least once in the area [0;1=2]  [0;pm
k ].
Claim 2. The pair of prices f^ p; ~ pg that satises (12) and (13) is unique.
22Proof. To show this uniqueness result, it is enough to show that 1 increases in ~ p at a rate less than
1, while 2 does so at a rate greater than 1. From (15), since @G=@^ p < 0; we know that 1 increases in ~ p
if and only if @G=@^ p + @G=@~ p < 0: For the case k > 2; we can then write
xk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1

@G(^ p; ~ p)
@~ p
+
@G(^ p; ~ p)
@^ p

= (n   k)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + k^ p)(" + ~ p)
n k 1 (x   ^ p   ")d"
+ (n   k)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k (" + k^ p)d"
+ ( x   ^ p + ~ p)(k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k (2" + k^ p)d"
  ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k+1  xk 2 [2 x + (k   1) ^ p];
which can be simplied to
xk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k

@G(^ p; ~ p)
@~ p
+
@G(^ p; ~ p)
@^ p

= (n   k)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + k^ p)(" + ~ p)
n k 1 d"
+ (k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k (2" + k^ p)d"   ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k  xk 2 [2 x + (k   1) ^ p]: (22)
We now notice that the RHS of (22) decreases in  x: In fact its derivative is
(n   k)xk 2 [x + (k   1)^ p](x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 +
+ (k   1)xk 3 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k [2x + (k   2)^ p]
 
h
(n   k)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1  xk 2 + (k   2)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k  xk 3
i
[2 x + (k   1) ^ p]
  2( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k  xk 2
which, after rearranging, is equal to
 (n   k) xk 1 ( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 < 0
23Therefore, if (22) is negative when setting  x = ^ p; then it is always negative, that is:9
xk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k

@G(^ p; ~ p)
@~ p
+
@G(^ p; ~ p)
@^ p

<  ~ pn k^ pk 1(k + 1) < 0:
Similarly, using (20), since @H=@^ p > 0; we know that @2=@~ p > 1 if and only if @H=@^ p+@H=@~ p < 0:







1    xn k
1    x
  (n   k)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 + (n   k)(n   k   1)
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k 2 (" + ^ p)
k d"
+ (n   k)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1

1    xk

+ (n   k)k
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k 1 d"
=  
1    xn k
1    x
+ (n   k)(n   k   1)
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k 2 (" + ^ p)
k d"
  (n   k)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1  xk + (n   k)k
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k 1 d" (24)
This expression decreases in  x because its partial derivative with respect to  x, after rearranging, is equal
to
 
1   (n   k)  xn k 1 + (n   k   1)  xn k
(1    x)
2
and we have already shown above that the numerator of this expression is positive. Thus, using  x = ^ p in







1   ^ pn k
1   ^ p
  (n   k) ~ pn k 1^ pk < 0:
The result then follows. 
Claim 3. The price charged by the merging stores is higher than the price of the non-merging ones, that
is, ^ p > ~ p.
9The same holds for the case when k = 2: We have
x(x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2

@G(^ p; ~ p)
@~ p
+
@G(^ p; ~ p)
@^ p

= (n   2)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)









n 1   (2 x + ^ p)(x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2 (23)
The derivative of (23) with respect to  x is negative because
(n   2)( x + ^ p)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 3 + 2( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2   2(x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2   (n   2)(2 x + ^ p)(x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 3
=   x(n   2)( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 3 < 0
Then
+x(x   ^ p + ~ p)
n 2

@G(^ p; ~ p)
@~ p
+
@G(^ p; ~ p)
@^ p

<  3^ p~ p
n 2 < 0








1    x
n 1
+ (n   1)
  x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
n 2 d"
=  1 +  x
n 1 +  x
n 1   ^ p
n 1 =  1   ^ p
n 1 < 0
24Proof. Let ~ p1 be the price at which the function 1 crosses the 45 degrees line, i.e., 1 (~ p1) = ~ p1;
likewise, let ~ p2 be such that 2 (~ p2) = ~ p2 (~ p1 and ~ p2 are represented in Figure 5). Given the properties of
1 and 2; if we show that ~ p1 > ~ p2 then we can conclude that ^ p > ~ p.





0 (" + ~ p1)
n 2 (" + k~ p1)d"
xn 1 (25)
Similarly, when ~ p = ~ p2 the FOC H (^ p; ~ p) = 0 gives:
1  
1    xn k
1    x
~ p2    xn k + (n   k)
  x ~ p2
0
(" + ~ p2)
n 1 d" = 0
which can be rearranged as
~ p2 = 1    x +
1    x
1    xn k (n   k)
  x ~ p2
0
(" + ~ p2)
n 1 d" (26)
For a contradiction, suppose that ~ p2 > ~ p1: Then the dierence between the RHS of (25) and the RHS





0 (" + ~ p1)
n 2 (" + k~ p1)d"
xn 1   1 +  x  
1    x
1    xn k (n   k)
  x ~ p2
0




0 (" + ~ p1)
n 2 (" + k~ p1)d"
xn 1 +
1 + (k   1)xk   k xk 1
kxk 1  
1    x
1    xn k (n   k)
  x ~ p2
0




0 (" + ~ p1)
n 1 d"
xn 1 +
1 + (k   1)xk   k xk 1
kxk 1  
1    x
1    xn k (n   k)
  x ~ p2
0
(" + ~ p2)
n 1 d" (27)
where the inequality follows from replacing " + k~ p1 by " + ~ p1 in the rst integral.
Since the second integral in (27) is equal to [xn   (~ p2)
n]=n, the whole expression in (27) increases in





(" + ~ p1)
n 1 d" +
1   (k   1)xk   k xk 1
kxk 1  
1    x
1    xn k (n   k)
  x ~ p2
0
(" + ~ p1)
n 1 d"
=






(1    x)(n   k)
1    xn k

+
1 + (k   1)xk   k xk 1
kxk 1 =
=




1    xn k   (n   k)  xn 1 + (n   k)  xn
 xn 1 (1    xn k)

+
1 + (k   1)xk   k xk 1
kxk 1
=
 xn   ~ pn
1
n(1    xn k)





1 + (k   1)xk   k xk 1
kxk 1 (28)
We now show that this last expression is positive, which establishes a contradiction. For this, we rst note
that the term in square brackets is positive. To see this, we take the derivative with respect to  x; which
gives:
n   k + (k   1)x k   (n   1)x n
and note that this expression is decreasing in n (its derivative is  x n [1   xn   (n   1)lnx] < 0): Then
we can set n = k + 1 and write that n   k + (k   1)x k   (n   1)x n < 1 + (k   1)x k   kx (k+1): This
25last expression increases in  x (its derivative is kx (k+2) [1 + x + k(1   x)] > 0) and therefore we can write
1 + (k   1)x k   kx (k+1)  0: Therefore, the square bracket decreases in x so we can use the value  x = 1
and show that
1    xn k   (n   k)  xn 1 (1    x)
 xn 1 > 0:
Finally we observe that the last term of (28) is also positive. This follows from the fact that the numerator
1+(k   1)xk k xk 1 decreases in  x and then we can use the value  x = 1 to write 1+(k   1)xk k xk 1 > 0:
Therefore we have proven that V > 0; which is impossible if ~ p2 > ~ p1: As a result, ^ p > ~ p. 
Figure 5: Existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 2. Since we have already proven that ^ p > ~ p; we focus on the inequality
~ p > p: (a) Consider the case in which the search cost is suciently low, that is, the case when  x ! 1:
We prove that ~ p > p by contradiction. Therefore, assume that, on the contrary, ~ p < p when  x ! 1:
The aggregate quantity sold in the market by all rms together is Q = 1  ^ pk~ pn k: Using the FOCs and
denoting the quantity sold by a non-merged rm by ~ q, and that sold by all the merging rms together by
^ q we can state that
Y (~ p; ^ p)  Q   (n   k)~ q   ^ q = 0
where




^ q = k^ pxk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k   k(k   1) ^ p
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k d":
26We now argue that Y (~ p; ^ p) is decreasing in ~ p: This is because @Q=@~ p < 0; @~ q=@~ p > 0 and
1
k(n   k)^ p
@^ q
@~ p = xk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1   (k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 d"
> xk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1   (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 (k   1)
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 d"
= (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 ^ pk 1 > 0
Next, since Y is decreasing in ~ p and by assumption ~ p < p we must have Y (p; ^ p) < 0: When
x ! 1; Y (p; ^ p) goes to:
1   ^ pkpn k   (n   k)p   k^ p (1   ^ p + p)
n k + k(k   1) ^ p
 1 ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + p)
n k d" (29)
Now we invoke the FOC of the merged entity, denoted above by G(^ p; ~ p). The function G(^ p; ~ p)
was shown to be increasing in ~ p so when ~ p < p we must have G(^ p; p) > G(^ p; ~ p) = 0: Therefore:
lim
 x!1
G(^ p; p)   ^ p +
1




(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k (" + k^ p)d"
=  ^ p +
(k   1)




(" + ^ p)








(" + ^ p)
k 1 (" + p)
n k d"
must be positive, which implies that it must be the case that
 k^ p (1   ^ p + p)
n k+k(k   1) ^ p
 1 ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + p)
n k d" >  k
 1 ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 1 (" + p)
n k d":
Using this inequality in (29), we get that
lim
x!1
Y (p; ^ p) > 1   ^ pkpn k   (n   k)p   k
 1 ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 1 (" + p)
n k d" (30)
This last expression is increasing in ^ p: This is because the sign of its derivative with respect to ^ p is the
same as the sign of the following expression
  ^ pk 1pn k   (k   1)
 1 ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + p)
n k d" + (1   ^ p + p)
n k




(" + ^ p)
k 2 d" + (1   ^ p + p)
n k
=  ^ pk 1pn k + (1   ^ p + p)
n k ^ pk 1 > 0
Therefore, (30) is greater than after setting ^ p = p; that is
lim
x!1









= np   (n   k)p   kp = 0;
27where for the last equality we have used the FOC of a rm in the pre-merger market. (If  x ! 1 then the
rst order condition of a rm in a pre-merger market becomes 1 np (p)n = 0.) Consequently, if ~ p > p
then we have limx!1 Y (p; ^ p) > 0, which establishes a contradiction.
(b) Consider now the case in which the search cost is suciently high, that is,  x ! pm
k : From
proposition 1 we know that the solution to the FOCs is unique. Therefore, if we nd two prices for which
(12) and (13) hold when  x ! pm
k ; then these prices are indeed the equilibrium prices. Let us take the limit
of the LHS of (12) and (13) when  x ! pm
k and let us use the notation lim x!pm
k ~ p = ~ pl and lim x!pm
k ^ p = pm
k :






















The rst equation is indeed zero given the denition of pm
k and the second equation therefore gives the
value of ~ pl when  x ! pm
k : We note that the price ~ pl is less than pm = 1=2 because, as shown in the proof
of proposition 1, H (pm
k ;1=2)  0.
We are interested in comparing ~ pl with the pre-merger equilibrium price. Let us use the notation
pl = lim x!pm
k p: We now argue that ~ pl > pl. To show this, we take the limit when  x ! pm
k of the FOC
that determines pl. This gives:
(1   pm
k )(1   pn
l )   pl [1   (pm
k )
n] = 0
If we x the value of pm
k then the solution of this equation, pl; decreases with n: Comparing this equation
with (31), since n   k < n, it is immediately clear that ~ pl > pl.
(c) Finally, we look at the case n = 3: If n = 3 then the FOC of a merging rm
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
 
1    x2   2^ p x

+ 2
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)(" + 2^ p)d" = 0
may be rearranged as follows
^ p3   ^ p x2   ~ p  








   x + ^ p: (32)
The FOC of a non-merging rm
1   ~ p    x + ^ p   ~ p +
  x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
2 d" = 0






   x + ^ p = 2~ p   1:
Using this in (32) we have
^ p3   ^ p x2   3~ p^ p2   ~ p + 1 = 0;
or
~ p =
1 + ^ p3   ^ p x2
1 + 3^ p2 :
28From the FOC in the pre-merger market we get that
p =
1   p3
1 +  x +  x2:
Since, by strategic complementarity, ~ p increases in ^ p and since ^ p > p; the dierence ~ p   p is
greater than when we replace ^ p by p. Therefore
~ p   p =
1 + ^ p3   ^ p x2
1 + 3^ p2  
1   p3
1 +  x +  x2 >
1 + p3   p x2
1 + 3p2  
1   p3
1 +  x +  x2 (33)
The RHS of this expression is concave in  x because its second derivative with respect to  x is negative:
 
2p




 x(1 +  x)
(1 +  x +  x2)
3 < 0
Hence, if the RHS of (33) is positive with the highest and the lowest possible values of  x then it is positive
for all possible  x values. Setting  x = 1 in the RHS of (33) gives
2   3p   3p2 + 4p3 + 3p5
3(1 + 3p2)
: (34)
which is always positive as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Plot of expression 34
Setting  x = p in (33) gives
p
 
1   3p + 3p2
1 + 3p2 > 0:
Thus, ~ p > p. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We rst prove that the function 1 (~ p) shifts downwards if  x increases.
From the relation G(1(~ p); ~ p;  x) = 0; we obtain that @1=@ x =  (@G=@ x)=(@G=@^ p): Above in the proof







1   xk   k^ pxk 1
kxk
 
(k   1)(x   ^ p + ~ p) + (n   k)x
xk (x   ^ p + ~ p) n k+1
 x ^ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k (" + k^ p)d":






1   xk   k^ pxk 1
kxk +

(k   1)(x   ^ p + ~ p) + (n   k)x
xk (x   ^ p + ~ p) n k+1

( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k  





1   xk   k^ pxk 1
kxk

k   1  
(k   1)(x   ^ p + ~ p) + (n   k)x




1   xk   k^ pxk 1
(n   k)
kxk 1 (x   ^ p + ~ p)
< 0
where the last inequality follows form the fact that for G(^ p; ~ p) = 0 it must be the case that 1  xk k xk 1^ p <
0. As a result, we conclude that 1 (~ p) shifts downwards when  x increases.
We now show that 2 (~ p) shifts upwards when  x increases. From the relation H(1(~ p); ~ p;  x) = 0; we
obtain that @2=@ x =  (@H=@ x)=(@H=@^ p): Above in the proof of Proposition 1, we have already shown
that @H=@^ p > 0. Therefore, we need to show that @H=@ x < 0: In fact, taking the derivative of H with








1   (n   k)xn k 1 + (n   k   1)xn k
(n   k)(1   x)
2   (x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k 1 (1   xk) < 0;
where the last inequality uses the fact that 1   (n   k)xn k 1 + (n   k   1)xn k is decreasing in x and
equals 0 when x = 1.
Since 1 (~ p) shifts downwards while 2 (~ p) shifts upwards when  x increases, we conclude that ^ pand
~ pdecrease in x (or increase in s). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Post-merger, the prot of a merging rm is ^ =k, while pre-merger it is
. Then, we need to consider the dierence ^ =k   .

















where we use the same notation as above in the proof of Proposition 2: ~ pl = limx!pm
k ~ p: We have shown



































where, again as in the proof of Proposition 2, pl = limx!pm
k p: If we demonstrate that
(pl)



























then the result follows.
To show that (35) indeed holds, we observe that the pre-merger market FOC
1   pn   p(1   xn)
1   x
= 0; (36)
which determines the value of p; is decreasing in p: Taking the limit of (36) when x ! 1=
p
3 gives
1   (pl)n   pl
 
1   3 n=2
1   3 1=2 = 0
























1   3 1=2 (37)
which is always positive as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Plot of expression (37).
Since (36) is decreasing in p; then (35) must hold.
(b) Using the denition of pm
k , we have that 1   (pm
k )k = k(pm














































Note that 1   (pm
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31which shows that for any k, merging is not protable whenever search costs and the number of competitors
is suciently high.
(c) To prove this, we show that in the limit when  x ! 1 (or search costs go to zero), ^ =k    > 0.







(1   ~ pn)

> 0;
because in the limit when  x ! 1;
~ p
n (1   ~ pn) >
p
n (1   pn).
Observe that equilibrium prots of the merging rms are
^  = ^ p
"
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
n k

1    xk

+ k
  x ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k (" + ^ p)
k 1 d"
#
Taking the derivative of ^  with respect to ^ p and taking the limit when  x ! 1 gives
 (1   ^ p + ~ p)
n k k^ p + k
 1 ^ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k (" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + k^ p)d":
This expression is identical to the FOC (12) when  x ! 1. As a result, for any value of ^ p < ^ p (where ^ p
is the equilibrium price of a merging rm when  x ! 1), this derivative is negative. Since the equilibrium
price of a non-merging rm is lower than the price of a merging one, we have
lim
 x!1






(" + ~ p)









(" + ~ p)







(1   ~ pn) > lim
 x!1
k:
where the last inequality follows from the observations that ~ p (1   ~ pn) increases in ~ p and ~ p > p: The
result then follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by deriving the payos of the rms in the situation where
consumers start searching at the merging stores. As above, let ^ p and ~ p denote the equilibrium prices of
merging and non-merging stores, respectively. Consider rst the payo of the merging stores when they
deviate by charging a price ^ p 6= ^ p. W.l.o.g. assume the merging stores are visited in a particular order,
say, rst the merging store 1, then the merging store 2 etc. all the way till the merging store k. Consider
a consumer who starts searching and visits the rst merging store. If the match value there is less than
 x   ^ p + ^ p, the consumer will continue searching and visit a second merging rm. Otherwise, the buyer
will acquire right away the product sold there. In the second shop, and all the way till the (k   1)th store
the tradeo faced by the consumer is exactly the same. Therefore, the direct demand obtained by the rst
k   1 merged stores is
k 1 X
i=1
( x   ^ p + ^ p)
i 1 (1    x + ^ p   ^ p) = 1   ( x   ^ p + ^ p)
k 1
When a consumer arrives at the kth merging rm, the tradeo a consumer faces is dierent because
the rm to be visited next is a non-merging rm and this type of rm charges a dierent price, namely
32~ p. As a result, the consumer will search beyond the last merging rm if the highest observed utility is
less than  x   ~ p. In addition, we note that the consumer left the other k   1 shops of the merged entity
because the utility levels there were less than  x   ^ p. Since ^ p < ~ p by assumption, this implies that some
consumers may decide to return from the kth merging rm to one of the other merging rms. Denoting
the fraction of consumers who return to a previously visited merging store without visiting all shops in the
market by ^ rm, we have:





( x   ^ p + ^ p)
k   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k
i
The sub-index m refers to the fact that these consumers return to a merging store after visiting only the
merging stores.
A consumer terminates her search at the last merging store if the match value there is higher than
at the other merging stores and it is not worth to continue searching further at the non-merging stores.
This happens with probability
Pr["k   ^ p > maxf x   ~ p; zk 1   ^ pg]
= ( x   ^ p + ^ p)




( x   ^ p + ^ p)
k   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k
i
Finally, some consumers visit all shops in the market and return to one of the merging stores to
conduct a purchase. This fraction of consumers, which we denote ^ ra to refer to the situation that consumers
come back to one of the merging stores after visiting all rms in the market, is given by:
^ ra  Pr[ x   ~ p > zk   ^ p > maxf0; zn k   ~ pg]
= k
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 1 (" + ~ p)
n k d"
Putting the dierent demand terms together, the joint payo function of the merging stores equals
^ (^ p) = ^ p
"
1   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k + k
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 1 (" + ~ p)
n k d"
#
Taking the FOC and imposing the equilibrium requirement that consumer expectations are correct we
obtain the following condition:
1   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k   k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1 ^ p + k
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k (" + k^ p)d" = 0 (38)
Consider now the payo function of a non-merging rm that deviates by charging a price ~ p 6= ~ p.
Since consumers expect that all non-merging rms charge the same price ~ p, we assume that they sample
the non-merging rms in a random way. Thus, the probability that a typical non-merging rm is visited
rst, second and so on till the position n   k equals 1=(n   k). Note that conditional on arriving at a
non-merging store, the probability that the buyer terminates her search there is 1    x + ~ p   ~ p. Consider
a consumer who has visited all the merging stores and h   1 non-merging ones. Note that the consumer
33walked away from the merging stores because the highest match value there was lower than  x   ~ p + ^ p;
likewise, the consumer left the other non-merging stores because the match values there were lower than
 x. Then the direct demand of a non-merging store when it is visited in hth place equals:
1
n   k
 xh 1 ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k (1    x + ~ p   ~ p)





 xh 1 ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k (1    x + ~ p   ~ p) =
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k
n   k
1    xn k
1    x
(1    x + ~ p   ~ p)
A non-merging store also obtains demand from consumers who visit all sellers in the market and
return to it to conduct a purchase. Denoting this demand as ~ ra to refer to the fact that these consumers
return to a non-merging rm after visiting all other rms in the market we have:
~ ra  Pr[maxf0; zk   ^ p; zn k 1   ~ pg < "i   ~ p <  x   ~ p]
=
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k (" + ~ p)
n k 1 d"
Putting together the various sources of demand of a non-merging rm, we obtain its payo function:
~  = ~ p
"
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k
n   k
1    xn k
1    x
(1    x + ~ p   ~ p) + ~ ra
#
The corresponding FOC is:
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k
n   k
1    xn k
1    x
(1    x   ~ p) +
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k (" + ~ p)
n k 1 d" = 0 (39)
If an equilibrium exists, the equilibrium prices ^ p and ~ p must be given by the system of equations (38)
and (39).
(a) We now prove that when search cost is suciently high then ^ p > ~ p and therefore consumer
expectations are violated. We start by noting that, because the price of the non-merging rms is less than
or equal to 1=2 < pm
k for all  x 2 [pm
k ; 1], the integral in (38) is positive. As a result, for an equilibrium
to exist, the rest of the LHS of (38), 1   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k   k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k ^ p; must be negative. Note that
this expression decreases in ^ p. Then, it must be higher than when we set ^ p = ~ p because ^ p < ~ p by
assumption. That is, it must be the case that
1   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k   k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k ^ p > 1    xk   k xk 1~ p (40)
We now note that when  x ! pm
k the expression 1    xk   k xk 1pm
k is equal to zero. Since ~ p  1=2 < pm
k ;
it is clear that 1    xk   k xk 1pm
k > 0 when  x ! pm
k : But this constitutes a contradiction because then the
LHS of (38) cannot be negative. As a result, there is no such pair of prices ^ p and ~ p that satisfy (38) and
(39) when  x ! pm
k and ^ p < ~ p.
(b) We prove now that when search cost goes to zero again we obtain ^ p > ~ p, which violates
consumer expectations. To show this we use the following equality
Z  Q   ^ q   (n   k) ~ q = 0
34where Q = 1   ^ pk~ pn k denotes the aggregate quantity sold in the market and ^ q and ~ q denote the
equilibrium quantities of the merged entity and the non-merging rms. From the FOCs, these quantities
are given by
^ q = k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1 ^ p   k(k   1) ^ p
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k d"
~ q =
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1
n   k
1    xn k
1    x
~ p
The partial derivative of Z with respect to ^ p is negative because ~ q increases with ^ p and the
derivative of ^ q with respect to ^ p is positive:
@^ q
@^ p = k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1 + k(k   1)( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 2 ^ p   k(k   1)
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 (" + ~ p)
n k d"
  k(k   1)(k   2) ^ p
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 (" + ~ p)
n k d"
> k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1 + k(k   1)( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 2 ^ p   k(k   1)  xn k
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 2 d"
  k(k   1)(k   2) ^ p xn k
  x ~ p
0
(" + ^ p)
k 3 d"
= k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 2 ( x   ~ p + k^ p)(1    xn k) > 0:
Therefore, given that ^ p < ~ p; if we set ^ p = ~ p then Z must be negative when  x ! 1. That is, it
must be the case that
lim
 x!1
Zj^ p=~ p = lim
 x!1
"
1   ~ pn   k~ p + k(k   1) ~ p
 1 ~ p
0
(" + ~ p)





1   ~ pn   n~ p +
k(k   1) ~ p
n   1
 
1   ~ pn 1
< 0: (41)
The FOC (39) may be rearranged as
1    x   ~ p +
(n   k)(1    x)
1    xn k
1
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k
  x ~ p
0
(" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k d" = 0 (42)
The LHS of (42) increases in ^ p because
k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k   x ~ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k 1 d"   k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1   x ~ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k d"
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
2k
=
k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
  x ~ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k 1 d"   k
  x ~ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k d"




  x ~ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k 1 ( x   ~ p + ^ p   "   ^ p)d"




  x ~ p
0 (" + ~ p)
n k 1 (" + ^ p)
k 1 ( x   ~ p   ")d"
( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k+1 > 0
35Therefore, given that ^ p < ~ p; if we set ^ p = ~ p then the LHS of (42) must be positive, that is,
1    x   ~ p +
(n   k)(1    x)





( xn   ~ pn) > 0 (43)







(1   ~ pn)

> 0
This inequality implies that 1   ~ pn   n~ p > 0 in the limit when  x ! 1. This implies that (41) is positive.
But this constitutes a contradiction and therefore it cannot be the case that ^ p > ~ p when  x ! 1:
(c) Now we prove that ^ p > ~ p if n = 3. We will use the results from the proof of part (b) of this
proposition. If n = 3 then Z (~ p) simplies to
Z^ p=~ p = 1   ~ p3   2 x~ p + ~ p  
 x2   ~ p2
   x~ p = 1   2~ p3 +
 
 x2   3 x

~ p
while condition (43) reduces to




 x3   ~ p3
> 0
or




 x3   ~ p3
:
Then,
Z^ p=~ p > 1   2~ p3 +
 
 x2   3 x


1    x +
 x3   ~ p3
3 x2




















3 + 17 x   72 x2 + 72 x3   16 x4
(44)
which is always positive as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Plot of expression 44
Therefore, Z^ p=~ p > 0 and ^ p > ~ p if n = 3.
(d) Finally, in the limit when n ! 1 the FOC of the merged entity becomes
1   ( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k   k( x   ~ p + ^ p)
k 1 ^ p = 0 (45)
36while that of a non-merging rm becomes
1
1    x
( x   ^ p + ~ p)
k (1    x   ~ p) = 0:
This implies that limn!1 ~ p = 1    x.
The LHS of (45) decreases in ^ p: Then, if ^ p < ~ p; the LHS of (45) must be negative if we replace
^ p by ~ p = 1    x. However,
1    xk   k xk 1 (1    x) = 1 + (k   1)  xk   k xk 1  0
where the inequality follows from setting  x = 1: This establishes a contradiction so ^ p < ~ p cannot hold in
the limit when n ! 1: 
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